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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK, : Case No. 20070534-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
First, the State's comments during closing rebuttal constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct and this Court should not cure the State's misconduct by taking judicial 
notice of the evidence that the State failed to produce at trial. Instead, this Court should 
reverse because the State's misconduct prejudiced Buck's case. 
Second, this Court should apply the reasonable hypothesis test when reviewing 
Buck's sufficiency of the evidence claim. Applying the reasonable hypothesis test, this 
Court should reverse because the evidence presented at trial, including the marshaled 
evidence, supported the reasonable hypothesis that this case involved a civil dispute in 
which Buck honestly believed that he had an ownership interest in the computer or that 
Myers, if present, would not have objected to his taking it. Further, the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to reasonably exclude this reasonable alternative 
hypothesis because reaching the opposite conclusion—that Buck acted with the specific 
intent to steal—required the jury to indulge inference upon inference. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL 
BECAUSE THE STATE ENGAGED IN PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT THAT PREJUDICED BUCK'S CASE 
First, the prosecutor's statements during closing rebuttal constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct that cannot be cured by taking judicial notice of the evidence that the State 
failed to produce at trial. Second, this Court should reverse because the misconduct 
prejudiced Buck's case. Third, this Court should reach the merits of Buck's prosecutorial 
misconduct claim because he timely raised it in his motion to arrest judgment. 
A. The Prosecutor's Statements Constituted Prosecutorial Misconduct and This 
Court Should Not "Cure" the State's Misconduct By Taking Judicial Notice 
of the Evidence that the State Failed to Produce At Trial. 
During closing rebuttal, the prosecutor said: 
Who did the operating system belong to? Who owned the licenses of those items? 
[Buck] can't own the licenses of those items. Those were owned by Mr. Myers. 
Mr. Myers didn't have the ability to give them up. . . . The[re] were operating 
systems on there, Windows Microsoft Word, Acrobat Adobe, again these are 
things you can't just give away. . . . So, just 'cause you used it and needed it, 
that's not sufficient basis to have an honest belief. 
R. 287:187.l When read as a whole, these words convey the State's argument that Buck 
could not have acted with an honest belief because he knew that the licensing agreements 
The Jury Trial Excerpts attached to Buck's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Arrest Judgment contain a transcription of the State's closing rebuttal with the 
inaudible sections filled in. R. 253; see Addendum A. This transcription reveals that the 
prosecutor said Mr. Myers did not have the ability to give Buck the software licenses 
"even if he thinks he did." IdL This language further conveys the State's argument that 
the licensing agreements for the software installed on the computer forbade Myers from 
giving the computer to Buck or to the partnership. See id. 
2 
for the software installed on the computer forbade Myers from giving the computer to 
him or to the partnership, Id compare Aple. Br. at 31. 
This argument was not a "[mjodest recharacterization of the evidence." Aple. Br. 
at 31. Rather, as explained in the opening brief, it was a direct attack on the affirmative 
defense based on evidence that the State never presented to the jury. See Aplt. Br. at 19-
20. This is well evidenced by the State's request that this Court take judicial notice now 
of the evidence that it did not present to the jury then. See Aple. Br. at 30-32. 
Specifically, the State asks this Court to take judicial notice that an operating system, 
Microsoft Word, and Adobe Acrobat were installed on the computer, and that the 
licensing agreements for those programs forbade Myers from giving the computer to 
Buck or to the partnership. See Aple. Br. at 30-32. 
Contrary to the State's request, this Court should not take judicial notice that 
particular software was installed on the computer or that the licensing agreements for that 
software forbade Myers from giving the computer to Buck or to the partnership. "The 
appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity and should defer 
to the trial court on factual matters." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1J19, 52 P.3d 1158 
(citations omitted). "It is inappropriate for an appellate court to disregard the trial court's 
findings of fact and to assume the role of weighing evidence and making its own findings 
of fact." Id. (citations omitted). Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows this 
Court "to take judicial notice of a fact cnot subject to reasonable dispute' because the fact 
is 'capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
3 
cannot reasonably be questioned.'" Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (citations omitted). But this Court will only take judicial notice "where there 
is a 'compelling "countervailing principle" to be served.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
In this case, the State offers no evidence to show that its assertions are "capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned." Utah R. Evid. 201(b). At trial, the State did not prove what programs 
were installed on the computer. R. 287:57-59, 63-64. And it has not provided this Court 
with the licensing agreements for those programs. See Aple. Br. at Addenda. Without 
this information, this Court cannot determine if the licensing agreements forbade Myers 
from giving the computer to Buck or to the partnership. See Utah R. Evid. 201(b). 
Likewise, the State has not shown that the intricacies of the licensing agreements are 
"generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court." Li 
Even if the State had met the requirements of rule 201(b), correcting prosecutorial 
misconduct is not a compelling countervailing principle that justifies judicial notice. In 
its brief, the State acknowledges that the prosecutor's statements were "questionable" 
because he failed to produce evidence to support his assertions. Aple. Br. at 26. 
Regardless, it argues that this Court can correct the prosecutor's error by taking judicial 
notice of the evidence he failed to present at trial. See idL "It is the sole and exclusive 
province of the jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evidence 
offered by the state is weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted." State v. 
Lopes, 1999 UT 24,1|16, 980 P.2d 191 (citation omitted). Thus, the State cannot cure its 
4 
failure to produce the evidence that it "encourage[d] jurors to consider," State v. Bakalov, 
1999 UT 45, T|59, 979 P.2d 799 (citations omitted), by asking this Court to take judicial 
notice of that evidence now. 
Therefore, because the prosecutor referenced matters not in evidence and 
encouraged the jury to reject the affirmative defense and convict based on these matters, 
the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. See Aplt. Br. at 19-20; Bakalov, 1999 UT 
45 at H59; State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349,1J22, 173 P.3d 170, cert, denied, 186 P.3d 
957 (Utah 2008). Further, because the State has failed to meet the requirements of rule 
201(b) and because curing prosecutorial misconduct is not a compelling countervailing 
principle, this Court should not take judicial notice of the evidence the State failed to 
produce at trial. 
B. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Prejudiced Buck's Case. 
Our supreme court applies the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to 
cases "[wjhere the error results in the deprivation of a constitutional right." State v. 
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f!5, 55 P.3d 573; see State v. Villarreal 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 
1995) ("Where 'the error in question amounts to a violation of a defendant's right of 
confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, its 
harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal is required unless the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (citations omitted)). 
Utah courts recognize that prosecutorial misconduct claims are based on the 
5 
defendant's "constitutional rights to due process and to confront witnesses against him." 
See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988) (assuming, where defendant 
did "not specify the legal basis for" his claim "that the prosecutor's statements . . . were 
unsupported by any evidence and were unfairly prejudicial," that the claim was "based on 
his federal constitutional rights to due process and to confront witnesses against him" 
(citations omitted)); State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 853 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
("We note that prosecutorial misconduct claims are generally characterized as due 
process challenges, and are therefore constitutionally-based" (citations omitted)). 
Recognizing prosecutorial misconduct as a constitutional claim, our supreme court 
applies the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to prosecutorial misconduct 
cases. See State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, <([54, 174 P.3d 628 ("If prosecutorial misconduct is 
established, the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(citation omitted)); State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah 1977) (applying harmless-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to a prosecutorial misconduct case). 
Buck's prosecutorial misconduct claim, like other prosecutorial misconduct 
claims, is based on his "constitutional rights to due process and to confront witnesses 
against him." Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1254; see Cummins, 839 P.2d at 853 n.10; R. 235; 
239-44; 286:10; Addendum A. Thus, following our supreme court's precedent in Eaton 
and Ross, this Court should apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. See 
Stale v. Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, [^9, 156 P.3d 854 f" Vertical stare decisis . . . compels 
a court to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court.'" (citation omitted) 
6 
(alteration in original)); but see State v. Tiliaia, 2006 UT App 474, ^11, 153 P.3d 757 
(affirming where "comments, even if improper, were not particularly significant, and we 
think it highly unlikely that [defendant] would have received a more favorable result 
were these statements omitted from the prosecutor's closing arguments"), cert, denied, 
168 P.3d 339 (Utah 2007). 
Even if this Court chooses not to apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard, it should still reverse. See State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, ^13, 167 P.3d 
516 ("If, upon review, we conclude that absent the [prosecutorial] misconduct, 'there is a 
reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable result. . . , we will 
reverse.'" (citation omitted)), cert, denied, 186 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008). As explained in 
section II and in the opening brief, the evidence proving that Buck acted with the specific 
intent to steal and not with an honest belief was circumstantial and highly conflicting. 
See supra at Part II; Aplt. Br. at 21-23. Accordingly, there is a reasonable likelihood the 
jury was influenced by the State's improper argument because the jurors were "especially 
susceptible to influence" and even "a small degree of influence may [have been] 
sufficient to affect the verdict." State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991); see Todd, 
2007 UT App 349 at 1J35. 
Moreover, the jury instructions were insufficient to "cure" the prejudice caused by 
the prosecutorial misconduct. Aple. Br. at 38. In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 
1973), the trial court specifically admonished the jury that it "should neither consider nor 
be influenced by any statements of counsel as to what the evidence is unless it is stated 
7 
correctly, nor by any statement of counsel of facts not shown in evidence, if any such has 
been made.'" Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. Despite this specific admonition, our supreme 
court did not hold that the jury instructions cured the prosecutorial misconduct. See id. 
Rather, it affirmed because "the prosecutor's rebuttal was in direct reply to the theory 
advanced by defense counsel in his final argument and that the[] remarks were within the 
range of reasonable inferences which could be drawn from the evidence." Id. Plus, it 
noted that there "were ample facts to support the jury's determination." Id, at 425. 
This case warrants a different result. First, unlike the trial court's specific 
admonition in Valdez, the trial court in this case only gave a general instruction: "What 
the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to give you a preview of expected 
evidence and to help you understand the evidence from their viewpoint." R. 208; 
compare Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426. Second, unlike the prosecutor's statements in Valdez, 
the prosecutor's statements in this case were not "in direct reply to the theory advanced" 
in Buck's closing argument or "within the range of reasonable inferences which could be 
drawn from the evidence." Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426; see R. 287:187. To the contrary, the 
prosecutor made the improper argument for the first time in closing rebuttal so that Buck 
had no opportunity to defend against it, and, as partially conceded by the State, did not 
elicit the evidence necessary to support the argument. See R. 287:187; Aple. Br. at 26. 
Third, unlike Valdez, there were not "ample facts to support the jury's 
determination" in this case. Valdez, 513 P.2d at 425; see R. 287. To the contrary, the 
evidence was circumstantial and highly conflicting. See Aplt. Br. at 21-23; 31-34. As 
8 
explained in section II and in the opening brief, the most direct and reasonable inference 
from the evidence was that Buck took the computer with an honest belief that he had an 
ownership interest in it or that Myers, if present, would not have objected. See supra at 
Part II.B; Aplt. Br. at 20-23, 30-34, 39-40. The alternative inference—that Buck acted 
with specific intent to steal—required "'inference upon inference,' or, worse, . . . 
inference upon assumption" to reach. State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), affd, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911; see supra at Part II.B. Thus, because "the 
evidence in the record [wa]s circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting," the jury in this 
case was "more likely influenced by [the prosecutor's] improper argument'" than the jury 
was in Valdez. Todd, 2007 UT App 349 at «[[35; see Span, 819 P.2d at 335. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse because there was a reasonable likelihood that 
the jury was influenced by the State's improper argument that Buck could not have acted 
with an honest belief because he knew the software licenses prevented Myers from giving 
him the computer. 
C. Buck Timely Raised His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim. 
This Court should reach Buck's prosecutorial misconduct claim because his 
motion to arrest judgment based on prosecutorial misconduct was timely. See R. 235; 
239-53; 286:8-14. In State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court 
determined that a prosecutorial misconduct claim is timely if it is raised through a motion 
for a new trial. Owens, 753 P.2d at 978; see also Valdez, 513 P.2d at 426 ("The 
9 
determination of whether the improper remarks have influenced a verdict is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court on motion for a new trial."). A motion for a new trial 
need not be raised at trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). To the contrary, it is timely if it is 
"made not later than 10 days after entry of the sentence." LI A prosecutorial misconduct 
claim may be raised following trial in a motion for new trial because "a motion for new 
trial generally is permitted for correcting errors made in the trial court, or for reviewing a 
conviction obtained by unfair or unlawful methods." Owens, 753 P.2d at 978 (internal 
and other citations omitted); see Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) (allowing trial court to grant 
motion for a new trial "in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."). 
Similar to a motion for a new trial, a motion for arrest of judgment need not be 
raised at trial. See Utah R. Crim. P. 23. Rather, it is timely if it is raised "[a]t any time 
prior to the imposition of sentence." Utah R. Crim. P. 23. A motion to arrest judgment is 
appropriate to address situations where "the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a 
public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest 
of judgment." Utah R. Crim. P. 23; see Owens, 753 P.2d at 978. 
None of the Utah cases cited by the State disagree with this Court's holding in 
Owens that a prosecutorial misconduct claim is timely if raised after trial but before 
appeal. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (declining to address 
prosecutorial misconduct claim that defendant raised for the first time on appeal); Valdez, 
513 P.2d at 426 (reaching merits of prosecutorial misconduct claim even though 
10 
"[d]efendant failed to assert an objection during the course of the argument, and the trial 
court was deprived of the opportunity to determine the matter or caution the jury"); State 
v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (same as Brown); but see State v. 
White, 577 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1978) (declining to reach prosecutorial misconduct claim 
where defendant raised his objection "after the jury had retired to deliberate"). 
Thus, because Buck, like the defendant in Owens, raised his prosecutorial 
misconduct claim it the trial court prior to his appeal, his motion was timely and this 
Court should reach its merits. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED BY DENYING BUCK'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
First, the reasonable hypothesis test is the appropriate test for this Court to apply 
when reviewing Buck's sufficiency of the evidence claim because Buck was not required 
to challenge the reasonable doubt instruction in order to assert the reasonable hypothesis 
test on appeal and the evidence presented at trial to prove that Buck acted with the 
specific intent to steal and not with an honest belief was entirely circumstantial. Second, 
this Court should reverse because the evidence presented at trial, including the marshaled 
evidence, supported the reasonable hypothesis that this case involved a civil dispute in 
which Buck honestly believed that he had an ownership interest in the computer or that 
Myers, if present, would not have objected to his taking it. And the evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient to reasonably exclude this reasonable alternative hypothesis because 
reaching the opposite conclusion—that Buck acted with the specific intent to steal— 
11 
required the jury to indulge inference upon inference. 
A. This Court Should Apply the Reasonable Hypothesis Test to Review Buck's 
Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim. 
This Court should apply the reasonable hypothesis test to review Buck's 
sufficiency of the evidence claim because: (1) Buck was not required to challenge the 
reasonable doubt instruction given to the jury in order to assert the reasonable hypothesis 
test on appeal; and (2) the evidence presented at trial was entirely circumstantial. 
1. Buck Was Not Required to Challenge the Reasonable Doubt Instruction Given 
to the Jury In Order to Assert the Reasonable Hypothesis Test on Appeal. 
On appeal, Buck does not challenge the reasonable doubt instructions given to the 
jury. Nor does he argue that a reasonable hypothesis instruction should have been given. 
As explained in State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), a reasonable hypothesis 
instruction "is unnecessary 'where the jury is instructed that the State must prove a 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1312 (citation 
omitted). "This is entirely logical, because if the jury believes that there is a reasonable 
hypothesis in the evidence consistent with the defendant's innocence, there would 
naturally be a reasonable doubt as to his guilt." State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 
1970). Alternatively, if the jury is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows that they regarded the evidence as excluding 
every other reasonable hypothesis." Id. 
Rather, Buck challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction 
12 
and argues that this Court should apply the reasonable hypothesis test to decide the issue. 
Because "excluding every other reasonable hypothesis" is "necessarily" part of a jury's 
guilty verdict, Utah's appellate courts have consistently applied the reasonable hypothesis 
test to review sufficiency claims in circumstantial evidence cases regardless of whether 
the jury was instructed on the reasonable hypothesis test. Schad, 470 P.2d at 247 (using 
reasonable hypothesis test on appeal without mentioning whether jury was instructed on 
reasonable hypothesis test); see also State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986) (reversing 
using reasonable hypothesis test without mentioning whether jury was instructed on 
reasonable hypothesis test); Layman, 953 P.2d at 782 (same); State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 
278, 281-83 & n.4 (Utah 1998) (noting that "a trial court is not required to instruct the 
jury on alternative reasonable hypotheses," and reviewing sufficiency claim using 
reasonable hypothesis test even though "the trial court did not give a reasonable 
hypothesis instruction to the jury"). 
In other words, as explained in State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992), the 
reasonable hypothesis test "is only one way of stating the prosecution's burden of proof, 
which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt," and "[s]uch an instruction need not be 
given in these terms in every circumstantial evidence case." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 236 
n.l. Thus, this Court should review Buck's sufficiency claim using the reasonable 
hypothesis test because Buck was not required to challenge the reasonable doubt 
instruction given the jury in order to assert the reasonable hypothesis test on appeal. 
13 
2. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Entirely Circumstantial. 
As admitted by the State, the "sole contested issue at trial" in this case was intent. 
Aplc. Br. at 16. "[I|ntent is rarely established by direct evidence." State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, *p6, 10 P.3d 346. Rather, "intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Ilolgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^26; see State v. 
Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) (explaining "that criminal intent is seldom 
proved by direct evidence but must be instead inferred from the circumstances of the 
given facts"); State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980) (same); State v. Hawkins, 
967 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (same). "Indeed, unless a confession is made by 
the defendant concerning intent, or unless the court is somehow able to open the mind of 
the defendant to examine his motivations, intent is of necessity proven by circumstantial 
evidence." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). 
This case is no exception. Buck did not admit that he intended to steal the 
computer. To the contrary, he consistently expressed his belief that he had an ownership 
interest in the computer or that Myers, if present, would not have objected to his taking it. 
See R. 287:120-27, 130-58. Thus, of necessity, the State's evidence "disproving that 
[Buck] acted with an honest belief was circumstantial. See Aple. Br. at 16-17. 
In particular, Buck's letter telling "Myers that he had taken the computer," Aple. 
Br. at 16, does not contain a confession that he took the computer with the specific intent 
to steal. R. State's Exhibit 3. Neither does Buck's admission that he took the computer 
from Myers' home nor his statement that he "'wouldn't steal from'" Myers. Aple. Br. at 
14 
16-17 (citing R. 287:121-22, 146). Thus, because any relationship between this evidence 
and Buck's intent is necessarily based on "inference and not personal knowledge or 
observation," this evidence is circumstantial. Black's Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed. 2004). 
This conclusion is well-evidenced by the State's discussion of the letter. See 
Aple. Br. at 16. To substantiate its argument that the letter is direct evidence, the State 
does not cite the language of the letter. See id Rather, it cites the letter's "tone," arguing 
that its tone "suggestfs] [Buck] took the computer . . . because he believed that Myers had 
failed to uphold his commitment to the partnership." Id This is an inference and, as 
such, is circumstantial evidence. See Black's Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed. 2004). 
Likewise, Myers' opinion regarding whether Buck acted with the specific intent to 
steal or with an honest belief was circumstantial evidence. R. 287:49-115. This is 
because Myers' personal opinion regarding Buck's intent was "based on inference and 
not on personal knowledge." Black's Law Dictionary 595 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, Myers' 
testimony that he believed the computer was not partnership property and that he did not 
give Buck permission to take the computer was not direct evidence of Buck's intent. 
Aple. Br. at 16 (citing R. 287:65, 71). 
B. This Court Should Reverse Because the Evidence Was Insufficient to Show 
that Buck Took the Computer With the Specific Intent to Commit Theft. 
When using the reasonable hypothesis test to review the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a circumstantial evidence case, this Court will "review the evidence and all 
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inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 236; see State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, p , 
985 P.2d 911. But, following this review, if it concludes that there was "no reasonable 
basis" for the jury to exclude "every other reasonable hypothesis," then this Court will 
"overturn the verdict." Schad, 470 P.2d at 247. 
Evidence is "insufficient to reasonably exclude reasonable alternative 
hypotheses," if it requires the "fact finder to indulge inference upon inference to reach a 
conclusion that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Lyman, 966 P.2d 
at 281 (citation omitted). "'A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt.'" Id 
(citations omitted). 
In this case, there may have been circumstantial evidence to support the State's 
case, but, as evidenced by the State's response brief, this evidence required "'inference 
upon inference,' or, worse, . . . inference upon assumption" to conclude that Buck acted 
with the specific intent to steal rather than with an honest belief. Layman, 953 P.2d at 
791 (citations omitted); see Aple. Br. at 21-24. 
First, the most direct and reasonable inference from Buck's letter is that Buck took 
the computer with an honest belief that he had an ownership interest in it or that Myers, if 
present, would not have objected. See R. State's Exhibit 3. By signing the letter and 
leaving it for Myers to find, Buck "simplified] his future location and identification." 
Hill, 727 P.2d at 223. Utah's appellate courts have inferred innocence, not guilt, from 
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such self-identifying actions. See Layman, 953 P.2d at 789-90 (reversing constructive 
possession conviction because the defense was consistent with the evidence and 
defendant "denied he had either drugs or alcohol in his vehicle," "did not attempt to flee," 
and "consented to a search"); Hill, 727 P.2d at 223 (reversing theft by receiving 
convictions because evidence "tended to support" the defense and the fact that defendant 
"had visited the store" before and "had signed his name and address in the store's register 
book, simplifying his future location and identification, . . . cast doubt on defendant's 
guilt"); State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387-89 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (reversing 
constructive possession conviction because evidence was consistent with the defense and 
defendant denied that he possessed drugs). 
The opposite inference—that Buck acted with the specific intent to steal—would 
have arisen if Buck took the computer without leaving the letter or if Buck had made 
statements inconsistent with his defense. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 346 (affirming because, 
among other things, defendant made inconsistent statements to police); State v. Smith, 
726 P.2d 1232, 1234-35 & nn. 1 & 2 (Utah 1986) (affirming theft conviction where 
evidence, including defendant's inconsistent statements, supported theft); Lyman, 966 
P.2d 282-83 (affirming because, among other things, defendant's denials that he went 
"into the maintenance closet that day" were inconsistent with the evidence). 
The interpretation offered by the State—the letter's "smugly righteous tone" 
implies that Buck "stole the computer out of anger and malice" and, therefore, with the 
specific intent to steal—required "'inference upon inference,' or, worse, . . . inference 
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upon assumption" to reach. Layman, 953 P.2d at 791 (citations omitted); see Aple. Br. at 
22-24. It also required the jury to ignore evidence showing that Buck believed Myers 
built the computer for Buck's use (R. 73, 75, 90, 150-51); Myers' role in both his 
personal relationship and his partnership with Buck was as the provider (R. 287:51-54, 
72, 92, 133, 153); Buck left a signed letter identifying himself and promising to pay for 
the computer (R. State's Exhibit 3); Myers knew Buck, knew where Buck lived, and 
knew the phone number of the house where Buck lived (R. 287:69-70); Buck was 
employed and making money with which to pay for the computer (R. 287:54-55); and 
Buck took the computer while Myers was on vacation because he was dissolving the 
partnership and wanted to avoid a confrontation. R. 287:144-45, 148, 153, 158. 
Second, Myers' testimony that he believed the computer belonged to him provides 
little, if any, insight into whether Buck acted with specific intent to steal or with an 
honest belief. S-ee Aplt. Br. at 32-34. Myers knew the intent behind his own actions, but 
not behind Buck's. To conclude that Buck took the computer with the specific intent to 
steal from evidence that Myers believed the computer belong to him would require 
"'inference upon inference,' or, worse, . . . inference upon assumption" that Buck knew 
Myers considered the computer to be his personal property rather than partnership 
property, that Buck agreed with Myers' belief, and the Buck took the computer anyway 
with the specific intent to steal it. Layman, 953 P.2d at 791 (citation omitted). 
Moreover, it would require the jury to draw these inferences despite evidence that 
showed Myers willingly assumed full financial responsibility for the partnership (R. 287: 
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51-54, 72, 92, 133, 153); Myers routinely provided financial support for Buck's personal 
life (R. 287:51-52); Myers and Buck lived together and commingled their assets (R. 
287:51-52, 105-06); the computer was in pieces when Buck moved into Myers' home (R. 
287:150-51); Myers had his son build the computer and told Buck that he could use it for 
the lawsuit (R. 287:73, 75, 90, 150-51); the lawsuit involved the patent for the bridle that 
Myers and Buck formed the partnership to sell (R. 287:72, 88, 136-37, 159); Buck never 
saw anyone else use the computer (R. 287:62, 143, 154); and the only data on the 
computer belonged to Buck. R. 287:62, 143, 154. 
Thus, this Court should reverse because the circumstantial evidence was 
insufficient to disprove the reasonable hypothesis that Buck, when he took the computer, 
honestly believed that he had an ownership interest in the computer or that Myers, if 
present, would not have objected to his taking it. If, however, this Court determines that 
the reasonable hypothesis test was not met, this Court should follow the example of other 
jurisdictions and reverse because this case is one of the rare cases where the verdict is 
against the clear weight of the evidence and manifest justice requires this Court to 
remand for a new trial. See Aplt. Br. at 35-40. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse without ordering a new trial because the evidence was 
insufficient to warrant the conviction. In the event that this Court does not reverse for 
insufficient evidence, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because the 
State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that prejudiced Buck's case and/or the guilty 
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verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. 
SUBMITTED this Ifi day of August, 2008. 
GC&li Q H &U_ ^-Cj^stiM^ 
LORI J. SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 
[p day of August, 2008. 
LORI JrSEPPI 
£^<fe2=^ aufe=_ 
DELIVERED this (jp day of August, 2008. 
^^ 
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
Case No. 051400781 
JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN 
Comes now Defendant, EDWARD ALLEN BUCK, by and through counsel, Stephen 
Howard, and hereby moves this court to arrest judgment in the above-entitled matter, pursuant to 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This motion is based on grounds that: (1) Mr. 
Buck's federal and state constitutional rights were violated when the prosecutor, in closing 
argument rebuttal, urged the jury to convict Mr. Buck of an offense different from that which was 
charged against him; and (2) the evidence presented is not sufficient to support a conviction on a 
charge of theft either as alleged in the probable cause statement, or as argued by the prosecutor in 
closing argument. This motion is supported by the accompanying memorandum. 
K DATED this day of May, 2007. 
STEPHEN W. HOWARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Attorneys for Defendant U ' f lf'' ' ° f'rl ^ 3k 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
Plaintiff, : ARREST JUDGMENT 
-v- : 
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK : Case No. 051400781 
JUDGE CHRISTIANSEN 
Defendant. : 
Defendant, EDWARD ALLEN BUCK, by and through counsel, hereby submits this 
memorandum in support of his Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On April 2,2007, the State of Utah filed an Amended Information which charged the 
Defendant, Mr. Edward Allen Buck with Theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). The Information alleged that Mr. Buck "obtained or 
exercised control over the property of Allen Myers." The Probable Cause Statement supporting 
the charge more specifically alleged that Mr. Myers had returned home and found that "his 
computer was missing," and that the computer had been found in Mr. Buck's possession. 
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On April 4, 2007, a jury trial was held in the matter. The State called two witnesses who 
testified in person, Mr. Allen Myers and Deputy Tracy Boughn. An affidavit was submitted, 
representing testimony from a third witness, Sergeant Paul Brenneman. A set of stipulated facts 
was also submitted to the jury. 
Mr. Myers testified that he had returned from an out-of-town trip in August of 2005 to 
find that a computer had been taken from his home. Mr. Myers testified that a letter from Mr. 
Buck had been left at the home. In the letter, Mr. Buck stated that he had taken the computer, 
and that he would pay Mr. Myers for the computer at fair market value when he had the funds. 
Mr. Myers conceded that he had previously given Mr. Buck permission to use the 
computer, and that Mr. Buck was the primary user of the computer. He further acknowledged 
that he had given Mr. Buck permission to enter the house and continue to use the computer even 
while Mr. Myers was out of town. 
The State stipulated that the computer had been examined by a governmental agency 
which specialized in the forensic examination of computers. The State further stipulated that the 
forensic examination of the computer did not reveal any data or files that appeared to belong to 
anyone other than Mr. Buck. 
The State elicited testimony from Mr. Myers that sometime around July, 2005, the 
computer was "rebuilt" due to problems associated with a computer virus. (See, "Jury Trial 
Excerpts," at 1:11-15, attached hereto.) Mr. Myers described the process of rebuilding the 
computer as reformatting the computer and reinstalling the software operating system ("OS") and 
loading other software applications. Id, at 1:16-2:7. 
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Mr. Myers testified that he did not have personal knowledge of what software was on the 
computer, because his son had rebuilt the computer. Id. at 2:5-8. However, he stated that 
normally the installed applications would include Microsoft Office and Adobe, in addition to the 
operating system. Id at 2:9-12. 
Mr. Myers testified that he was unable to contact Mr. Buck by telephone, but that he 
found Mr. Buck's vehicle parked at the house where Mr. Buck had been staying. Based on 
information from Mr. Myers, police then contacted Mr. Buck. 
Mr. Buck was contacted by Deputy Boughn. Mr. Buck acknowledged that he had the 
computer, and provided Deputy Boughn with a copy of the letter that had been left for Mr. 
Myers. Deputy Boughn informed Mr. Buck that the computer was being taken into evidence. 
Mr. Buck then assisted Deputy Boughn by carrying the computer out to the deputy's patrol 
vehicle, and assisted in loading the computer into the deputy's vehicle. 
In closing argument rebuttal, the prosecutor stated, 
Who did the operating system belong to? Who owned the 
licenses? You can't come take those... . Those were owned by 
Mr. Myers. . . . There are operating systems on there, Windows, 
uh, Microsoft Word, Acrobat Adobe, again those are things you 
can't just give away. All of the components were bought by Mr. 
Myers. So just cause he used it and needed it that's not sufficient 
basis to have an honest belief. 
Id at 4:4-10. 
After several hours of deliberation, and a so-called "dynamite" instruction from the court, 
the jury returned a guilty verdict. 
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DISCUSSION 
Under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court can arrest 
judgment "if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, . . . or there is other 
good cause for the arrest of judgment." The evidence presented at trial is not sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of the charged of theft. Further, "other good cause" 
to arrest judgment is supported by the constitutional violations as set forth in the following 
discussion. 
L STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS WERE 
VIOLATED WHEN THE PROSECUTOR URGED THE JURY TO CONVICT 
MR. BUCK OF AN OFFENSE OTHER THAN THAT WHICH WAS CHARGED. 
A. The State failed to inform Mr. Buck of the nature of the charges against him, 
specifically by failing to inform him that he was accused of stealing software 
and licenses. 
Under the United States Constitution, "Due process requires that 'the defendant receive[s] 
full notice of the charges, the elements, how the defendant's conduct amounts to a crime.. . . ' " 
State v. Merill 2005 UT 34, [^28, 114 P.3d 585 (quoting Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 
988, 991 (Utah 1993) (alteration in original)). 
The Utah Constitution provides more specific protections. "It is a fundamental principle 
of criminal law that a defendant is entitled to know "the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him." State v. Bush, 2001 UT App 10, ^ 14, 47 P.3d 69 (quoting Utah Const, art. I, §12). 
This provision of the State Constitution "requires that the accused be given sufficient 
information so that he or she can know the particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can 
adequately prepare his or her defense. State v. Bell 770 P.2d 100,103 (Utah 1988) (alterations, 
quotations, and citations omitted). 
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In other words, the accused must be provided with notice not only of what statute he is 
charged with violating, but also with notice of what conduct is alleged to have been committed. 
Putting it into the context of the present case, Mr. Buck was not only entitled to know that he was 
charged with committing a theft, but he was also entitled to know what he was alleged to have 
taken. 
In the present case, the State's probable cause statement alleged that Mr. Buck had taken 
a "computer" belonging to Mr. Myers. The term "computer" is defined as "electronic device 
designed to accept data, perform prescribed mathematical or logical operations at high speed, and 
display the results of those operations." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, 421 
(1996). In ordinary usage, the term "computer" refers to the hardware or physical components of 
the system. 
The State's closing argument in rebuttal served to change the essential nature of the 
charge. Rather than arguing that Mr. Buck had taken the computer hardware, the State instead 
argued that Mr. Buck had taken the software and software licenses. 
Mr. Buck had been given no notice that he was alleged to have stolen software or 
software licenses. Mr. Buck was not given sufficient information to allow him to know the 
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and prepare his defense. See, Bell, 770 P.2d at 103. 
B. By waiting until closing argument rebuttal to urge the jury to convict Mr. 
Buck for stealing software and licenses, the State denied Mr. Buck the 
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself against those accusations. 
The Utah Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, "the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel.. . ." Utah Const, art. I, §12. "The 
hallmarks of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard...." Utah County v. Ivie, 
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2006 UT 33,1J22, 137 P.3d 464 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 348-49, 96 S.Ct. 
893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). In the present case, Mr. Buck was deprived of the opportunity to be 
heard with regard to, or to defend against, the allegations that he had stolen software and 
software licenses. 
In his initial closing argument, the prosecutor presented a discussion of the elements of 
the charge. In this discussion, the prosecutor referenced only the taking of the "computer." The 
prosecutor chose to wait until rebuttal to raise the argument regarding software and licenses. 
Given the prosecutor's timing of the assertion that Mr. Buck had stolen software and 
software licenses, Mr. Buck had no opportunity to be heard with relation to the allegations of 
stolen software and licenses. He had no opportunity to defend against those allegations. 
The foregoing constitutional violations, both of the State and federal constitutions, 
provide good cause sufficient to merit the arrest of judgment in this case. 
II. EVIDENCE PRESENTED IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION 
FOR THE CHARGE OF THEFT. 
When a jury's verdict of "guilty" is based on insufficient evidence, arrest of judgment is 
proper. See State v Workman. 806 P.2d 1198 (Ut. App. 1991) aff d, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993); 
State v.Petree, 659 P.2d (Utah 1983); State v. McCardell 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982); State v 
Romero, 554 P.2d (Utah 1976). The evidence is reviewed to determine whether "there is 
sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 
(Utah 1991). 
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A. The State's argument that Mr. Buck stole software and licenses is 
unsupported by the evidence. 
The prosecutor, in closing argument, urged the jury to convict Mr. Buck for stealing 
software programs and software licenses. This argument is wholly unsupported by the evidence 
presented at trial. 
Mr. Myers testified at trial that he did not have personal knowledge of what software 
applications had been loaded on the computer, because his son had done the "rebuild." He 
specifically stated that he did not know what applications were installed. See, Jury Trial 
Excerpts, at 2:8. He testified only as to what programs normally would have been installed: an 
operating system, Microsoft Office, and Adobe software. 
No evidence was presented to show that the installation discs were taken. No evidence 
was presented to show that any software licenses were taken. In short, no evidence was 
presented at all that would support a finding that Mr. Buck had stolen software from Mr. Myers. 
The prosecutor's argument relating to stolen software was not supported by the evidence. 
By urging the jury to convict Mr. Buck of an offense for which there was no evidence, the 
prosecutor's argument had the effect of misleading and confusing the jury. 
B. The evidence that Mr. Buck had the specific intent required to support a 
conviction for stealing the computer (hardware) is so inconclusive that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. 
Setting aside the prosecutor's arguments regarding stolen software, the evidence 
presented still fails to appropriately support a finding that Mr. Buck committed the crime of theft 
by taking the computer (hardware) in question. 
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Theft is a specific intent crime that requires not only proof that a person exercised 
unauthorized control over another's property, but proof also of the "specific intent or purpose to 
deprive the other person of his/her property." State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 
1994); see also, State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986). The evidence presented in this case is 
insufficient to find the specific intent required under the statute. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Mr. Buck had, at a minimum, permission to use 
the computer, and that Mr. Buck was the primary user of that computer. It was stipulated by the 
State that the only data or files on the computer appeared to belong to Mr. Buck. According to 
Mr. Myers own testimony, Mr. Buck left a letter stating that he would pay Mr. Myers for the 
computer. 
The civil tort of conversion has been defined by the Supreme Court of Utah as "an act of 
willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled 
thereto is deprived of its use and possession." AUred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958). 
"Although conversion results only from intentional conduct it does not however require a 
conscious wrongdoing, but only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods 
inconsistent with the owner's right." Id. 
While the elements of theft and conversion may be similar, the specific intent element of 
theft creates a critical distinction. The elements of the civil tort of conversion require only that 
the owner of the property in fact "is deprived of its use and possession." IcL On the other hand, 
the elements of criminal theft require that a defendant have acted "with the intent or purpose to 
deprive the other person of his/her property." Larsen, 876 P.2d at 396. Although the distinction 
may seem subtle, it is significant. Civil conversion looks only at the result - deprivation of use 
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or possession. Alfred, 328 P.2d at 728. Criminal theft looks instead at the intent of the actor, 
requiring proof that the actor intended or had the purpose to deprive the owner of his property. 
Larsen, 876 P.2d at 396. 
It is the defense position that the evidence presented at trial is so inconclusive with regard 
to the element of intent that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that 
element. 
Because the evidence presented is not sufficient, either with regard to the allegation of 
stolen software and licenses or to the allegation of the stolen computer, it is appropriate for this 
court to arrest judgment in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Buck respectfully requests that this court arrest judgment and 
enter a judgment of acquittal. 
DATED this day of May, 2007. 
iPHENW. HOWARD 
Attorney for Defendant 
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State of Utah v. Edward Allen Buck 
Case No. 051400781 
Excerpts from Defendant's Jury Trial 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
DATA CD Count 11:09:07 -11:11:14 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
: 
Question; 
ATP: 
Witness: 
ATP: 
Witness: 
ATP: 
Witness: 
ATP: 
Witness: 
ATP: 
Now you talked earlier about virus problems? 
Uhhuh. 
What..., did this computer have any virus problems prior to it being taken 
out of your house? 
I sure wish I could say that it never had viruses but all my computers end 
up with viruses some time or another and..., a, this one being a common 
one and going to lots of locations seems to get the viruses the most, most 
prone. 
And when was the last virus problem, when did the last virus problem take 
place prior to the computer being taken? 
Um, my guess was based on one of the documents that was backed up was 
July 1, of 2005 that somewhere between that document and the time it was 
taken, you know, during those weeks that it was rebuilt at that time frame. 
Now when you rebuild a computer what does that do to the stuff on the 
computer? 
Well, basically it, if you don't do a "DOD" standard erase of the drive... 
Let me just, I don't know anything about a uDOD" what is a "DOD"? 
State of Utah v. Edward Allen Buck 
Case No. 051400781 
Attorney for Defendant, Stephen Howard 
Trial Excerpts 
1 
1 Witness: Well, there is different levels to erase data on files, sorry. So if you don't 
2 erase the data on files there is still potentially data there that can be 
3 retrieved. These were never "DOD" done so there were some files on 
4 there that were sensitive to some of the stuff in San Diego that I was 
5 concerned about. My son rebuilt this by doing the "OS" install which is 
6 typically where they reformat it with the "NTFS" format, probably 
7 formatting the data and then loading the new applications back on to it. I 
8 don't know what applications are on it at this point because I wasn't 
9 planning on knowing that information but I know the basics that we, well 
10 what we always have put on is Microsoft Office because of the Office 
11 Suite and the "OS" just those two fundamental programs and then Adobe 
12 because we use a lot of Adobe interfaces for reading documents. 
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State of Utah v. Edward Allen Buck 
Case No. 051400781 
Excerpts from Defendant's Jury Trial 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
1 DATA CD Count 11:33:00 - 11:33:24 
2 Questions to Alan Myers 
3 ATP: Who paid for the computer? 
4 Witness: I did. 
5 ATP: And who paid for the key board? 
6 Witness: I did. 
7 ATP: Who paid for the tower? 
8 Witness: I did. 
9 ATP: Who paid for all the components in the tower? 
10 Witness: I did. 
11 ATP: Who paid for the monitor? 
12 Witness: I did. 
13 ATP: Who paid for the operating system? 
14 Witness: I did. 
15 ATP: Who paid for the programs? 
16 Witness: I did. 
17 ATP: Who paid for the Microsoft Office Suite? 
18 Witness: I did. 
19 ATP: Who paid for internet access? 
20 Witness: I did. 
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3 ATP: If you look at the letter he said, "I used it and I needed it". The whole 
4 Myer family used it as well. Who did the operating system belong to? Who owned the 
5 licenses? You can't come take those. You can't own the licenses to those items. Those 
6 were owned by Mr. Myers and Mr. Myers doesn't have the ability to give them up even if 
7 he thinks he did . There are operating systems on there, Windows, uh, Microsoft Word, 
8 Acrobat Adobe, again these are things you just can't give away. All of the components 
9 were bought by Mr. Myers. So just cause he used it and needed it that's not sufficient 
10 basis to have an honest belief. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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